Trump’s extortion of Latin America: What the Republican has extracted through threats

Blackmail as foreign and trade policy. That has been Donald Trump’s approach toward much of the world — especially Latin America. During his first term, he pressured several countries in the region to take responsibility for curbing northbound migration and to accept hundreds of deportees. Now, back in power, he has once again resorted to the strategy that proved so effective for him then — this time to advance his campaign of mass deportations. Unlike his first term, when his threats largely took the form of sanctions, his main tool of intimidation this time has been tariffs, which he has used to extract concessions from long-standing allies like Mexico and Colombia.

“The United States’ commercial clout in Latin America is so great that it has managed to extort almost every country,” said Juanita Goebertus, director of the Americas Division at Human Rights Watch, in a recent interview with EL PAÍS. Just three months into office, the president has already secured an agreement from Claudia Sheinbaum’s government to militarize the Mexican border with the U.S., and from Colombia, Costa Rica, and Panama to allow U.S. immigration authorities to deport migrants to their territories. All of this has taken place under the pressure of escalating tariffs that the Republican administration has already imposed on them as part of its broader global trade war.

Mexico

Mexico is the Latin American country that stands to lose the most in Trump’s tariff war: the United States is its main trading partner, just as Mexico is the top supplier to the U.S. Aware of this leverage in the bilateral relationship, Trump made the country — along with Canada — the main target of his tariff threats from the very start of his term. In his second week back in the White House, he announced a 25% tariff on Mexican imports, starting February 4. His justification? That Mexico was not doing enough to stop the flow of fentanyl and migrants into the United States.

President Claudia Sheinbaum’s administration bowed to the pressure and managed to delay the tariffs in exchange for concessions. Mexico agreed to bolster security on its side of the border by deploying 10,000 troops to combat drug trafficking and irregular migration, as Trump had demanded. One month later, however, the Republican president imposed the 25% tariffs. They remain in place to this day, though their impact has been significantly reduced, as everything covered by the free trade agreement between the three North American countries — the vast majority of trade — is not subject to tariffs.

Nonetheless, President Sheinbaum has apparently yielded to Trump’s coercion on migration and security issues — most notably with the extraordinary extradition of 29 drug lords to the United States, a clear example of this compliance. Now, the Trump administration has revived a familiar threat from his first term: the possibility of a military intervention against drug cartels on Mexican soil. This is on top of the threats to trade, though no new tariffs have been announced so far.

Colombia

The same pattern has been repeated in Colombia. Trump also threatened President Gustavo Petro’s government with tariffs at the very start of his term, after the Colombian leader refused — on the morning of January 27 — to accept two deportation flights from the U.S. that he had previously agreed to receive. Trump responded by threatening Colombia with 25% tariffs, set to increase to 50% the following week, along with a series of financial and banking sanctions. He also suspended visas for all Colombian government officials and their associates.

The diplomatic standoff lasted less than a day. Although Petro initially stood up to the Republican president, he ultimately gave in that same Sunday night, agreeing to all of Trump’s demands — “the unrestricted acceptance of all illegal aliens from Colombia returned from the United States, including on U.S. military aircraft, without limitation or delay,” according to a government statement.

Later, in March, following a visit to Bogotá by U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem, Colombia announced that the two nations had also agreed to share biometric data to identify irregular migrants and transnational criminals.

In the end, however, Colombia was still hit with baseline tariffs of 10%, as part of the broad package of trade measures announced by the Trump administration in early April.

Costa Rica and Panama

Two other countries in the region that have agreed to accept deportation flights are Costa Rica and Panama, although with some key differences. First, neither country was publicly threatened with 25% tariffs, unlike Mexico and Colombia. Some analysts speculate that threats may have been made behind closed doors, as Secretary of State Marco Rubio visited both countries in February — after which they announced they would begin accepting deportees from the United States. For now, like Colombia, both nations were hit with the minimum 10% tariff rate in April.

Panama has also had to deal with imperialist threats from Trump, who insists he wants to regain control of the country’s interoceanic canal. Although the U.S. transferred control of the waterway to Panama over 20 years ago, the president has complained that China wields influence over the Panama Canal while Washington is forced to pay higher fees to use it. While the Panamanian government has firmly rejected any suggestion of U.S. control, it has been pressured into other concessions to appease the Republican president — such as allowing the U.S. firm BlackRock to purchase ports in the country.

Venezuela

The Trump administration’s coercive tactics against Nicolás Maduro’s regime in Venezuela have been even more varied. In addition to tariffs, it has wielded threats of sanctions and strikes against the country’s oil sector, while also deporting Venezuelan nationals to El Salvador, where they have been imprisoned in a maximum-security facility.

After Washington announced on March 4 that it was revoking licenses allowing the U.S. oil company Chevron to operate in Venezuela, Caracas responded four days later by stating it would no longer accept deportations of its citizens from the United States. This prompted the Trump administration to threaten Venezuela with “severe and escalating” new sanctions. In the end, Maduro backed down and agreed to resume deportation flights, which restarted later that same month.

On March 24, however, the Trump administration announced two additional measures. First, it declared that beginning April 2, it would impose 25% tariffs on all countries importing Venezuelan oil and gas, arguing that Caracas had sent “tens of thousands” of violent criminals to the United States. Second, it extended Chevron’s exit deadline — originally set for early April — until the end of May. This temporary reprieve offered some breathing room to Maduro’s already economically crippled regime, as the U.S. energy giant accounts for a quarter of Venezuela’s oil production. In addition, a 15% tariff was imposed on Venezuelan exports, although its implementation remains pending due to a 90-day pause announced by the White House.

Special mention: El Salvador

El Salvador’s case warrants a special mention. The relationship between Trump and Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele has proven mutually beneficial. For Trump, Bukele has been a partner willing to accept — and imprison — deported migrants from the U.S. without question. In return, Bukele not only secures favor with the most powerful man in the world, but also benefits financially — receiving $20,000 annually for each deportee incarcerated in the Central American country — as well as validation of his controversial prison model, which has been severely condemned for its poor conditions and human rights violations.

Perhaps most importantly for Bukele, El Salvador is set to receive at least nine key MS-13 gang members currently in U.S. custody. In exchange, Bukele offered the Trump administration a 50% discount on the per-inmate fee for housing deported migrants in his massive prison complex. A win-win situation for both leaders.

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